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William O. Miller 
Introduction. Stretching from thc 
west coasts of the Americas to thc Asian 
mainland lies the earth's most formi-
dable water barrier-·the Pacific Ocean. 
This mammoth body of water comprises 
two-thirds of the ocean area of the 
world and a full one-third of the earth's 
surface. Interspersed throughout this 
vast area are literally thousands of 
islands, divided generally into the island 
chains of Melanesia, Micronesia, and 
Polynesia. Sincc W cstern man has navi-
gated these waters, these islands of 
Oceania have becn sought after jealously 
by the world's powers--first for the 
pleasure and sojourn they offered, then 
for their wcalth, and finalJy for their 
strategic value. The peoples of thcse 
islands were extremely divcrse in racial 
haekground, culture, and social customs 
and groupings. They had only one thing 
in common. They were organized, if at 
all, into small, fragmented, premodern 
societies, with no effective capacity to 
resist domination hy any power inter-
ested in exercising it. 1 
The resulting scramble for hegemony 
culminated in the late lUOO's in large 
island groupings gradually becoming 
subject to the colonial administration of 
one or another of the Western powers. 
Since that time, as national powers have 
ebbed and flowed, sovereignty or con-
trol over most of these islands has 
undergone frequent change. This is par-
ticularly true of the isb.nds of Micro-
nesia which have been under the suc-
cessive control of Spain, Germany, 
Japan, and now the United States. 
These Pacific outposts became, in the 
early days of World War II, "foosteps,,2 
for a militaristic Japanese expansion 
southward toward Australia, and Lhey 
formed "a series of great spider webs 
'made to order' as one Japanese admiral 
said, to caLch any unwary nics LhaL tried 
Lo crm;s the Pacifi(:. ,,3 Lall~r they ~.~rvcd 
LllI~ f;:IIIIC pllrpOf;I\ for the llnill,(1 ~tat($ 
and its Allies in their successful efforts 
to choke off the exposed extensions of 
Japanese military power, and they pro-
vided successive rungs in the U.S. ladder 
constructed for assault on imperial 
Japan. 
The strategic significance of Oceania 
is a fact of modern history which 
underscores Admiral l\']ahan's classic 
analysis of the dependence on strategi-
cally located land hases for the effecLive 
exercise of seapower.4 Located as they 
are, athwart the maritime lines of com-
munication from the Western Hemi-
sphere to Southeast Asia, these islands 
have once-and could again--provide 
operaLing bases from which the.sealanes 
supporting the projcction of power into 
this area could be severed. 
Such obvious strategic considerations 
have not gone unnoted in the Soviet 
Union, whose respresentatives are cur-
rently making significant efforts to re-
create in the Pacific groupings of small, 
fragmented politics, with no effective 
capacity to resist domination by a 
stronger power which is willing to risk 
adverse world opinion to exercise it--to 
create, once again, the very situation 
which existed in this area in the latl\ 
19th cenLury. The modality of Lhe 
Soviet approach is not the traditional 
exercise of military power, but rather a 
sustained political assault on Western 
hegemony through the medium of the 
United Nations and its "Committee on 
the Situation with regard to the Imple-
mentation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples," commonly 
known as the "Special CommiLtel\ of 
TWI'nty-follr. " 
This paper will traee the historical 
anLCCl\(ltmts of the "Special CommiLLee 
of Twenty-four," and it will thereafter 
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prcsent an analysis of the CommiLtee's 
aCLiviLies, which are seen to refleet an 
effective conversion hy the Soviet 
IJnion of the international yearning for 
~('lf-(ldenllillali()11 of pcoples illlo all 
ullrdcntilll!: eold w'lr .1s-,,;lIIlt 011 W(!stern 
presence in the Pacific Ocean area. The 
ohjective of this assault is felt to be: 
first, thc denial to the Western Powers, 
principally the United States, of the use 
of these island areas; and second, to 
make them ripe for Communist political 
subversion and ultimately for Commu-
nist exploitation. 
International Concern for Dependent 
Peoples: An Historical Sketch: 
a. The Covenant of the League of 
Nations_ From the timid beginnings of 
article 22 of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, the efforts of the interna-
tional community to bring ahout a 
universal application of the principle of 
self-determination of peoples have 
assumed an ever-expanding scope. It will 
he remembered that in the aftermath of 
World War I the problem of the disposi-
tion of former enemy colonial posses-
sions was resolved by the creation of the 
League Mandate system under which 
thcse tcrriLorics were theoretically taken 
under internaLional contro\. Such terri-
tories whose peoples were" . _ . not yet 
ahle to stand by themselves under the 
sLrenuous conditions of the modern 
world" were entrusted to the tutClage of 
"more advanccd nations" who were 
willing to accept the "sacred trust of 
civilization" and to provide for their 
"well-being and development." 
Whatever defects may have existed in 
this system, and there were many,S it 
mllst he said Lhat the very creation of a 
scheme of even tenuous international 
conLrol over colonial areas represented a 
dramatic departure from prior practices. 
It assumes even greaLer significance 
whcn it is re(:ogllizcd that Lhis was a 
voluntary act on the parL of the WesLern 
nations whose past policies had heen to 
ex Lend their own individual imperial 
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control over widely dispersed colonial 
possessions.6 While it may be true that 
the international control of the League 
was of the colonial powcrs' own dcsign, 
it did signal the hcginnings of a reform 
movcmcnt under which the entire inter-
national community would seek to over-
see the transformation of dependent 
peoples toward self-determina~ion. 
h. The Charter of the United Na-
tions. The Second World War gave addi-
tional impetus to international concern 
over the problems of dependent 
peoples. Particularly was this true in the 
United States where almost all respon-
sible officials, including the President, 
were of the view that the days of 
colonialism were past and that in the 
new postwar order there should be a 
comprehensive trusteeship system em-
bracing all dependent people.7 Al-
though no such all-pervasive system 
developed, there were significant ad-
vances made toward more effective 
international supervIsIOn. Again, it 
seems important to note that these steps 
were taken by the victorious mandatory 
and colonial powers on their own initia-
tive and despite strong opposition of 
somes because of their recognition of 
"the right of all people to choose the 
form of government under which they 
will live ... ,,9 
This new order for dependent 
peoples was to be structured on two 
basic concepts: first, an expanded and 
im proved in ternational trusteeship 
system with a view toward the ultimate 
"self-government or independence" of 
the trust territpries;Io. and second, a 
declaration by the colonial powers of 
their duties toward, and the rights of, 
the dependent peoples of all territories 
who "have not yet attained a full 
measure of self government. ,,11 
(1) The Trusteeship System. The 
newly created trusteeship system func-
tioned under an institutionalized Trus-
teeship Council composed equally of 
administering and nonadministering 
powers.12 To be placed under this 
system were the territories formerly 
held under League Mandate, those 
detached from enemy control as a result 
of World War II, and those territories 
which might be voluntarily placed undcr 
the system by any of the. colonial 
powers.13 Only 10 of the formerly 
mandated territories plus Somalilancl 
were placed under Trusteeship Council 
supervision.14 In the Pacific area these 
included the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands, formerly mandated to 
Japan but now under the administration 
of the United States; the Trust Territory 
of New Guinea under Australian admin-
istration; and Western Samoa and Nauru 
under New Zealand and Australian 
administration, respectively. 
Specific trusteeship agreements were 
entered into wiLh the adminisLering 
powers stating specifically the terms 
under which the trust was to be exer-
cised. The Trusteeship Couneil was in-
vested with significant powers to over-
see the exercise of these trust agree-
ments. It was given authority to con-
sider reports to be submitted regularly 
by the administering powers, to receive 
and examine petitions from inhabitants 
of the territories, and to conduct visits 
to and inspections of the territories 
themselves. 15 
It seems important to note at this 
juncture that through the operation of 
this system all of the original trust 
territories, with the exception of New 
Guinea and the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands, had gained their inde-
pendence by early 1968. 
(2) The Charter Declaration of the 
Rights of Dependent Peoples. While the 
U.N. trusteeship system was essentially 
an improved version of the League 
Mandates, the truly "striking innova-
tion ,,16 in this area affected by the 
charter was the provisions of chapter Xl 
and, more specifically, the provisions of 
article 73. In this article the members of 
the United Nations, including those 
administering dependent territories, 
committed themselves to the proposi-
tion that the "interests of the inhabi-
tants of these territories are para-
mount," and acceptcd as 
•.. a sacred trust the obligation to 
promote to the utmost .•• the well-
being of the inhabitants ..• to develop 
self government, to take due account 
of the political aspirations of the 
peoples, and to assist them in the 
progressive development of their free 
political institutions, according to the 
particular circumstances of each terri-
tory and its people .... 
The administering powers further agreed 
to transmit regularly to the Secretary 
General statistical reports on the eco-
nomic, social, and educational condi-
tions in their respective dependent terri-
tories. 
The covenant's "sacred trust" was 
thus proclaimed to embrace not only 
the people of former enemy territories 
but, indeed, to embrace the people of 
all dependent territories. The colonial 
powers had stated their formal recogni-
tion of the principle that their own, 
long-held colonial possessions were now 
wards of the international community 
as a whole and that the objective of 
their administrations, at least in the eyes 
of the international community, was to 
provide these people with such assis-
tance as might be required for their 
ultimate exercise of the right of self-
dctermination. Significantly absent, 
howcver, was any institutionalized 
system to oversee the exercise of this 
"sacred trust" with respect to any of 
the non trusteeship territories. 
c. The "Magna Carta" of Anti-
colonialism As noted above, the United 
Nations trusteeship system has func-
tioned so effectively that all but two of 
the original 11 trust territories have now 
gaincd thdr indcpendcm:c. Many ex-
planations ('0111" hI: givml for this, not 
the Irast of which could be that the 
territories involved were not long-term 
historical possessions of the adminis-
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tering powers but, rather, wcre former 
enemy territories of relatively recent 
acquisition. Also, it is obvious that the 
machinery of the charter gave the inter-
national community as a whole a rather 
significant influence over these terri-
tories through the powers legislated to 
the Trusteeship Council. 
In the first 15 years of the United 
Nations' operations, some 34 dependent 
territories, including eight trusteeship 
and 22 nontrusteeship territories, had 
gained their independence. 1 7 Neverthe-
less, there remained at the end of 1960, 
64 dependent territories under the 
administration of colonial powers. 1 II 
While, therefore, there had been major 
progress toward decolonization, it is 
quite apparent that with respect to the 
non trusteeship dependencies the prog-
ress was measurably slower than was the 
case with those under Trusteeship Coun-
cil supervision. It was to speed up this 
process that the United Nations, aug-
mented in 1960 with the admission to 
membership of 17 ex-colonial states, 
took such significant action that this 
year must be described as the watershed 
in the. "rising tide of decolonization."1 9 
In a dramatic address before the 
General Assembly on 23 September 
1960, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers of the 
U.S.S.R., stated that the time had come 
for the "complete and final abolition of 
the colonial system in all its forms and 
manifestations," and he submitted for 
the consideration of the General As-
sembly a draft declaration calling for 
the granting of immediate independence 
to all trust and nonself-governing terri-
tories.20 A modified Soviet proposal 
later submitted proclaimed that in the 
colonial territories "the swish of the 
overseer's lash is heard ... [that] 
... heads fall under the executioner's 
axe," that all colonial counlries Illllst he 
/.,'Tantell their int!epen"cnee forthwith 
"and that all foreign hases in other 
states must be e1iminated.,,2 1 Through-
out the debates whieh followed, Soviet 
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spokesmen continued this type of vitri-
olic attack on all forms of "Western 
colonialism," giving particular and stri-
dent verbal attention. to the subject of 
Western military bases in foreign coun-
tries and Western military alliances. 
Western spokesmen answered these 
attacks by accusing the Soviet Union, 
itself, of adopting a new form of co-
lonialism which "had been imposed by 
force on people who had been free for 
centuries." They also made a specific 
point of stating their recognition of the 
aspirations of all people who did not 
presently enjoy a full measure of self-
government and expressed a profound 
regret that the Soviet Union would 
undertake to "pervert for its own pur-
poses the deef and genuine desires" of 
these peoples. 2 
Recognizing the urgent need for a 
resolution more moderate in tone than 
that submitted by the Soviet Union, and 
perhaps recognizing also the urgent need 
to attempt to remove U.N. decoloniza-
tion efforts from the center of the 
East-West cold war struggle where it had 
been cast by the Soviets, 43 Afro-Asian 
nations collaborated in drafting a com-
promise resolution on this subject. This 
resolution was submitted to the General 
Assembly by Cambodia, and it was 
adopted on 19 December ]960, as 
General Assembly Resolution 
ISI4(XV), by a vote of 89 to 0 with 
nine nations, including all of the West-
ern colonial powers, abstaining.23 
This declaration has been variously 
described as a "capstone to the U.N.'s 
efforts to supervise colonial regimes, ,,24 
as a kind of anticolonialism "magna 
carta,"25 and as "almost an amendment 
to the charter.',26 Certainly, all of these 
descriptions are accurate, since the reso-
lution itse!e 7 speaks in broader and yet 
more definite terms than has any similar 
document in history. In its operative 
paragraphs it declared: 
1. The subjection of peoples to alien 
domination and exploitation consti-
tutcs a denial of fundamental human 
rights, is contrary to the Charter of thc 
United Nations and is an impediment 
to the promotion of world peace and 
co-operation. 
2. All people havc thc right to self-
determination; by virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural develop-
ment. 
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, 
social or educational preparedness 
should never serve as a pretext for 
delaying independence. 
4. All armed action or repressive 
measures of all kinds directed against 
dependent peoples shall cease ••• 
5. Immediate steps shall be 
taken ... to transfer all powers to 
the peoples of these territories, with-
out any conditions or reservations, 
in accordance with their freely ex-
pressed will and desire, •.• in ordcr 
to enable them to enjoy complete 
independence and freedom. 
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial 
or total disruption of the national 
unity and the territorial integrity of 
a country is incompatible with the 
purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
7. All States shall observe faithfully 
and strictly the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the present Declaration 
on thc basis of equality, respect for 
the sovereign rights of all peoples 
and their territorial integrity. 
Without a single dissenting vote, the 
General Assembly thus proclaimed what 
must be regarded as an overwhelming 
international consensus that the era of 
colonialism was past and that all of its 
remnants must give way to the right of 
all people to self-determination. 
While it is true that the General 
Assembly is not a lawmaking hody, that 
it can only recommend and not legis-
late, the overwhelming majority by 
which this resolution was adopted and 
the fact that not even the colonial 
powers against whom it was primarily 
directed dared vote against it indicate 
the persuasive moral force that underlay 
it. Thus it must be said that, technical 
legal arguments notwithstanding, the 
international community regards it as a 
morally, and perhaps legally, defensible 
proposition that all peoples have a right 
to self-determination, which "demands 
the speediest possible ending of all 
colonial relationships, and condemns 
uLLerly any extension or reestablishment 
of colonial rule.,,2 s 
The political lessons long taught by 
Western philosophers and statesmen had 
thus come back full circle, and the 
former pupils, now possessed of or-
ganized moral and political strength in 
an international setting, were reminding 
their former tutors in forceful terms of 
the lessons learned. It does seem ironic, 
however, that the Western nations have 
appeared to abdicate their leading role 
in this effort to their cold war adver-
saries in the Soviet Union. 
d. The Committee of Twenty-four. 
Seizing the initiative again in the next 
session of the General Assembly, the 
Soviet Union on 26 September 1961 
complained that, despite the 1960 
declaration, some 88 territories still 
remained under colonial domination, 
that no steps had been taken to transfer 
administration to the indigenous 
peoples, and that, further, "the colonial-
ist powers' network of bases on foreign 
soil was being used to hamper the 
liberation of colonial peoples and jeop-
ardize the independence of newly inde-
pendent countries." The Soviets again 
submitted a draft resolution for con-
sideration,29 and, again, it was vitriolic 
and vituperative in tone. It called, in 
part, for the final and unconditional 
liquidation of colonialism by not later 
than the end of 1962 and for the 
establishment of a special commission 
to inquire into the situation with regard 
to the implemenLlItion of the 1900 
declaration. A compromise n:solution 
was again proposed hy a grouping of 
Afro-Asian states, which, after con-
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siderable -discussions repeating the acri-
mony of the 1960 debates, was adopted 
by an ovcrwhclming vote of 97 to 0 
with only four abstentions. 
Resolution 1654(XVI) of 27 Novem-
ber 1961 reaffirmed the provisions of 
the declaration and called upon all 
states to take action "without further 
delay" to implement it. The resolution 
also established a special committee of 
17 members, to be appointed by the 
President of the General Assembly, to 
inquire into the situation regarding 
implementation of the declaration and 
to make appropriate recommendations 
and suggestions.3o In 1963, with the 
addition to its competence of matters 
involving the trust territories, this com-
mittee became the only U.N. body 
under the General Assembly which was 
concerned generally with all nonself-
• •• 31 govermng terri tones. 
In early 1962 the President of the 
General Assembly appointed the follow-
ing states as members of the Special 
Committee: Australia, Cambodia, Ethi-
opia, India, Italy, Madagascar, Mali, 
Poland, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, the 
U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and 
Yugoslavia.32 At the 17th session of the 
General Assemhly, the membership of 
the Committee 'yas expanded to a total 
of 24 by the addition of Bulgaria, Chile, 
Denmark, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, and 
Sierra Leone.3 3 
With this composition it takes little 
imagination to envisage the philosophy 
which the Committee was to adopt and 
the course of action it was to follow. It 
does seem worthy of note that the 
Committee, from its outset, was 
weighed heavily against those powers 
which administered dependent terri-
tories. Of the 24 Committee members, 
12 were ex-colonial territories, four 
were Soviet oriented, and only three 
a d ministering powers--Austmlia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States 
-were members. New Zealand, which at 
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the time continued to administer the 
Cook Islands and Niue and Tokelau 
Islands, was not even represented; nor 
were France and Portugal, both of 
whom continued to administer several 
dependent territories. 
The Committee of Twenty-four and 
the Pacific Islands. 
a. Initial Consideration-Conflict with 
the Trusteeship Council. As would be 
expected from the membership of the 
Special Committee, it gave its initial 
attention to the African depcndent ter-
ritories, and it would be fair to say that 
the problems of these African depen-
dencies have continued to be forcmost 
in the Committee's considerations. Be-
ginning in 1964, however, with the 
formation of special subcommittees34 
to study and report on nonself-govern-
ing territories in specific geographical 
areas, the Committee significantly 
broadened its activities. It was in this 
year that it first began to study elosely 
the Pacific Island dependencies. Some 
16 Pacific Island areas were con-
sidered.3s These areas were dispersed 
throughout the central and western 
Pacific, both above and below the equa-
tor, and comprised literally thousands 
of islands--from Pitcairn with a land area 
of only 4 square miles and a population 
of only 126, to Papua and New Guinea 
with land areas of over 180,000 square 
miles and a combined population in 
excess of 2 million. The Committee's 
task was further complicated by the fact 
that these island areas were adminis-
tered by six separate administering 
powers--the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Australia, New Zealand, 
France, and· Portugal. 
The Committee met almost continu-
ously during 1964, considering most of 
the nonself-governing territories in the 
Pacific in some detail. Reports were 
submitted to the General Assembly 
covering each of the territories COIl-
sidered, and recommendations were 
made concerning each territory. AI-
though these differed in detail one from 
the other, the same general thread ran 
through them all--the Committee's insis-
tence that progress toward self-deter-
mination in all of the territories was too 
slow and that the people of each of 
these areas should he given the earliest 
opportunity to express their wishes with 
regard to their future status "in accor-
dance with well established democratic 
proccsses under United Nations super-
vision." The reports were generally 
accompanied by reservations from the 
administering powers who felt either 
that they did not accurately reflect the 
conditions in the territory, that pro-
posed visits to some of the territories 
were outside the Committee's compe-
tence, or that progress toward self-deter-
mination was entirely consistent with 
the needs and desires of the local 
populations.36 
Two aspects of the 1964 Committee 
reports deserve speeial consideration: 
(1) the apparent conflict between the 
Trusteeship Council and the heavily 
oriented anticolonialism of the Special 
Committee; and (2) the growing deter-
mination of the Special Committee that 
complete independence must he the 
goal sought for all dependent peoples, 
regardless of their own needs or of their 
possible future independent viability. 
Concerning the first of these, the 
Trusteeship Council's reports to the 
General Assembly, while urging the 
administering powcrs to continue their 
efforts leading toward self-determina-
tion in their respective territories, did 
express general satisfaction with the 
political procedures being implemented 
in each of them. 3 7 With respect to the 
U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands, the Council took special 
note of the report of its visiting mission 
that "no fully maturcd opinions" had 
yet developed in the territory concern-
ing its political future. Further, it ex-
pressed the hope that the "future Con-
gress of Micronesia would direct its 
attention to all the possibilitic:s--from 
indcpendencc to all other options--
which lay open for the future of the 
Terri tory. ,,3 g 
The Trusteeship Council's reports 
werc in marked constrast to the findings 
of the Committee of Twenty-four that 
the progress toward self-determination 
in the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands "did not fully meet the require-
ments of the Charter" and of the 1960 
declaration and that progress in New 
Guinea and Nauru "had been slow and 
adequate steps had not yet heen 
taken.,,39 
Another area of conflict arose in the 
Special Committee's proposal to send its 
own visiting mission to the Trust Terri-
tory of the Pacific Islands. A strenuous 
U.S. ohjection was voiced to such a visit 
since it was considered that visiting 
missions to trust territories were fhe 
peculiar province ~f the Trusteeship 
Council and, were, hence, outside the 
competence of the Special Committee. 
This objection was overruled by the 
Committee by what has now hecome an 
almost characteristic voting pattern of 
16 to 5 with 2 abstentions.4o 
It is worth noting, also, that in its 
1964 report on the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands, the Trusteeship 
Council expressed an approval of several 
possibilities of an ultimate status for a 
dependent territory extending from 
"independence to all other options_" 
The Special Committee, on the other 
hand, had from the beginning stead-
fastly opted for complete independence 
as the only acceptahle goal. While this 
may not he readily apparent on the face 
of the Committee's reports, it does 
become clear when one notes that the 
Committee consistently refers only to 
the 1960 declaration which speaks in 
terms of "complete independence." The 
two bodic$ congis(('ntly i~norc(1 one 
anothl'r, 1I11I11,,'rhal's more pertincnt the 
(;cncrlIl Assembly Resolution which 
proclaims the Assembly's understanding 
of the term "self-determination." On 15 
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Decemher 1960, only 1 day after the 
1960 declaration was adopted, the 
Gencral Assembly adopted Resolution 
1541(XV), which provides in pertinent 
parts as follows: 41 "A Non-Self-Govern-
ing Territory ean be said to have 
reached a full measure of self-govern-
ment hy: (a) Emergence as a sovereign 
independent state; (b) Free association 
with an independent state; or (c) Inte-
gration with an independent state." By 
ignoring this resolution in its entirety 
and by consistently reiterating only the 
theme of the 1960 declaration, the 
Committee clearly indicated an un-
willingness to accept any status short of 
"complete independence" as a satis-
factory conclusion of the self-determi-
nation process. That such a proposition 
would not he permitted to prcvail over 
the freely expressed desires of a local 
population for political association with 
its administering power fortunately was 
demonstrated hy the 1965 resolution of 
the General Assembly, GA RES 
2064(XX), approving the results of a 
plebiscite in which the Cook Islanders 
elected free association with New Zea-
land rather than complete indepen-
dence.42 
Another questionable acti~ty of the 
Committee, which first hecame ap-
parent in 1964, is its announced deter-
mination to carry another of the decla-
ration's principles to extreme lengths, 
that no reason-smallness, isolation, in-
adequate political, economic, social, or 
educational preparation--should impede 
the granting of independence. In its 
1964 reports on the small island terri-
tories, the Committee' declared that, 
regardless of their size, the "provisions 
of the Declaration were fully applicable 
to ... [them] ... and that appropriate 
measures to this end should he taken 
without delay." 
Thc absurd sitlllltion which this ~()rt 
of thillkin~ clIn bring IIlIout ill illustrated 
by the fact thaL ill J alluary 196B Lhc 
Territory of Nauru, with a land area of 
only 8 square miles and a tolal popula-
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tion of only 4000 persons, became an 
independent, sovereign state.43 
h. Renewed conflict and the Military 
Bases Issue. The Committee's 1965 
proceedings brought forth once again 
what was now becoming a familiar 
refrain. The Soviet Union, supported by 
its Communist friends and by most of 
the former colonial states, continued ~o 
urge and condemn the slowness of the 
pace toward independence, and for the 
first time the Soviet Union specifically 
went on record as opposing any s_ort. of 
merger between the admmistenng 
powers and their dependent terri-
tories.44· More significantly, however, 
the U.S.S.R. used the Committee as a 
vehicle to continue its cold war assault 
on Western military bases on foreign 
soil, and particularly to condemn those 
located in dependent territories. As a 
result of the Committee's recommenda-
tions, a draft resolution was adopted by 
the General Assembly's Fourth Commit-
tee which stated that the existence of 
military bases in dependent territories 
"constituted an obstacle to the freedom 
and independence of these territories" 
and called upon the administering 
powers to dismantle them. When pre-
sented to the General Assembly, al-
though these provisions received a 48 to 
37 affirmative vote, they were held to 
have been rejected since they did not 
receive the two-thirds majority required 
for an "important question," which the 
President of the Assembly considered 
them to be. This procedural ruling was 
to obtain for less than 1 month, how-
ever, and on 20 December 1965 a U.S. 
objection based on this point was over-
ruled; and by a simple majority the 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 
2105(XX), requesting the "colonial 
Powers to dismantle their military bases 
in colonial Territories and to refrain 
f bl' I . ,>4 5 rom esta IS Hng new ones. 
The conflict betwccn the Special 
Committee and the Trusteeship Council 
becamc more obvious in 1965. With 
respect to all the three remaining trust 
territories, the Trusteeship Council 
arrain indicated general satisfaction with 
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the progress heing made. In COlIlllIg to 
these conclusions, the Council had 
spccifically rejected Soviet proposals 
which would have condemned the 
administering powers' discharge of their 
trusts.46 The Spccial Committce, how-
ever, reported to the General Assembly 
in almost the same critical terms which 
had been rejected by the Trusteeship 
Council. The voting strength of the 
anticolonialist bloc in the General As-
sembly was clearly illustrated by the 
resolutions adopted in which, on two of 
these territories,4 7 the General As-
sembly only took note of the conclu-
sions of the Trusteeship Council while 
affirmatively endorsing "the recommen-
dations and conclusions of the Special 
Committee. " 
This vote left little doubt that, at 
least as far as the General Assembly was 
concerned, the Special Committee, with 
its strong anticolonialist bias reflecting 
that of the General Assembly, would 
thereafter be considered the U.N.'s prin-
cipal anticolonialist tool, regardless of 
the provisions of the charter. 
This has certainly been the case sincc 
1965. A procedure seems to have been 
adopted under which subcommittees, 
without even "token representation" of 
the administering powers, will provide 
critical reports to the Committee which 
will then, almost in haec verba, endorse 
the subcommittee's criticism and for-
ward it to the General Assembly which 
will do likewise. This has resulted in 
General Assembly resolutions during 
both 1966 and 196748 which have, in 
ever more strident language, condemned 
the "negative attitude" of the adminis-
tering powers and their "repression of 
colonial peoples"; reasserted that co-
lonialism is "incompatible with the 
Charter"; rciterated that "the cstablish-
ment of military basis and installations 
in these territories is incompatihle with 
the purposes and principles of the 
Charter ... and of General Assembly 
Resolution lS14(XV)"; requested that 
existing military installations be dis-
mantled; and, finally, deplored the re-
fusal of the administering powcrs to 
admit Committee missions to the dcpcn-
dent territories and requested that such 
missions be accepted. 
c. Conversion of the Anticolonialist 
Cause into a Second Cold War: the 
Military Bases Issue Crystallized. Both 
the Committee and the Gencral Assem-
bly debates which preceded the above 
resolutions demonstrate that the former 
colonial states, to which "no issue 
exceeds in importance their commit-
ment to securing a speedy and complete 
end of Western colonialism,'>4 9 have 
permitted themselves to be drawn by 
the U.S.S.R. into vituperative attacks on 
the Western states and particularly on 
the United States. Thus, their initial 
reluctance to enter this "second cold 
war"s 0 has long since passed. The de-
bates on the military bases issue provide 
clear evidence of this. At the beginning 
of its 1967 sessions the Committee 
heard the Soviet Representative, sup-
ported by many other members, con-
demn the existence of military bases in 
all dependent territories and state that 
"the utilization of military bases on 
Guam ... showed that they created an 
obstacle to independence. ,,5 1 The 
Soviet Union also used the Committee 
forum in 1967 to urge that the United 
States should be requested to dismantle 
its military bases in the Trust Territory 
of the Pacific Islands, the provisions of 
the strategic trusteeship agreement not-
withstanding. 5 2 
In May of 1967 letters were dis-
patched to each of the administering 
powers asking for information on their 
military activities in the territories 
under their administration. In July and 
August 1967 replies were recdved from 
Australia, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. NOIH~ 
were willing to provide such informa-
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tion, contending that their obligation to 
provide information on their territories 
was subject to security limitations and 
that the subcommittee had no right to 
ask for this type of information from 
them. As might be expected, this 
brought forth a rash of criticism of the 
Western Powers who, it was said, had 
the temerity to "challenge the Commit-
tees' right to information" and whose 
real purpose was to use their military 
bases "against freedom loving 
people. ,,53 
Although no more specific condem-
nation of military bases in the Pacific 
territories emerged from the Commit-
tee's 1967 sessions than the relatively 
mild recommendation that the military 
activity of the United States on Guam 
should be reduced,S 4 the mere fact that 
this recommendation was macIe, based 
as it was on Sovict complaints that 
Guam was being used as a base for U.S. 
aggression in Vietnam, lends credence to 
the proposition that the force of a clear 
majority of the Committee's members 
has been enlisted in the Soviet cold war 
camp. 
d. CriSis. The Committee's continued 
insistence on immediate implementation 
of the 1960 declaration and their con-
tinued rejection of any attempls by the 
administering powers to demonstrate 
that progress toward self-determination 
in their respective territories was in the 
best interests of lhc local populalion led 
the U.S. Representative to complain 
bitterly in early 196855 about what 
were termed "serious defects in the 
Committee's methods of work." He 
stated that the stereotyped and persis-
tent call for immediate independence 
was improper since "it was doubtful if 
independence was feasible" for all of 
them. He also "deplored the break-
down" in communicalions within the 
Committcc which frequcntly led to the 
exclusion of Representalives of the 
administering powers when resolutions 
were being drafted which were of par-
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ticular concern to them. He ended his 
presentation with the startling an-
nouncement that 
... lIn} view of the Committee's 
methods of work and the difficulties 
they have created for his delegation, 
the United States questioned whether 
any purpose would be achieved by 
further participation in the work of the 
Committee and was considering with-
drawal. After consulting with other 
delegations, however, his delegation 
had decided to defer its decision on 
that question. 
The United Kingdom also made 
strong complaints about the Commit-
tee's methods of work and provided 
suggestions for their change as well as 
for changes in the Committee's organi-
zation.56 
The ensuing debates saw, not an 
attempt by the Committee to structure 
its activities with a purpose of achieving 
more progress towards its goal by dip-
lomatic means, but, rather, a strident 
renewal of cold war invective. The 
Soviet Representative caustically at-
tacked the United States as "relentlessly 
undermining the efforts of the United 
Nations to end oppression ... [and] 
... attempting to crush the people of 
Vietnam under the force of arms." He 
accused the United States of occupying 
for many years "a number of Territories 
in the Pacific ... and transforming them 
into air and naval bases and instruments 
of its struggle against dependent 
peoples.,,57 Syria said that the United 
States and the United Kingdom were 
trying to "ridicule the Committee and 
discredit it." Yugoslavia and India con-
tended that the real difficulty was not 
the Committee's methods, but the re-
fusal on the part of the administering 
powers to cooperate. Bulgaria and 
Poland supported these criticisms and 
added their own charges of "perpetu-
ating the colonialist yoke," "ruthless 
foreign exploitation," and the use of 
these small territories "as sites for mili-
tary bases" through which to further 
their aggressive purposes. Finally, the 
Representative of Mali echoed the Com-
munist line by arguing that the "subtle 
attempts" to restrict the Committee's 
activities were "only an extension of the 
desperate ... [dcath throes] ... offcn-
sivc unleashed hy the coalition of re-
actionary neo-colonialist and imperialist 
forces. ,,5 8 
With these stinging and bitter accusa-
tions at the beginning of the 1968 
Committee sessions, the Communist 
states, with support from the former 
colonial states, gave warning that they 
intended to utilize the anticolonialist 
cause to its full measure in their cold 
war attacks on the United States. It 
soon became clear, viewing the matter 
from strictly a Pacific Ocean perspec-
tive, that the Soviet Union had now 
launched a full-scale offensive against 
the U.S. military bases in the Pacific 
which were being used so effectively to 
support the extension of U.S. power 
into Southeast Asia and which ob-
viously could be used in the future to 
support a continued and strong U.S. 
presence throughout the Pacific. The 
U.S. bases on Guam drew particularly 
extensive condemnation. It was con-
tended that they were typical examples 
of how the existence of military installa-
tions were having a negative effect "not 
only on the liberation of their people 
but also on internation'al relations in 
general," and that they were being used 
"for intervention and aggression against 
the people of Viet-Nam. "S 9 Guam was 
described as "nothing but a vast military 
base .... [whose] ... population had 
been indueted into the foreign 
army,,,60 and the United States was 
accused of using the islands of the Trust 
Terrilory of the Pacific Islands as missile 
and airbases and of planning a further 
expansion of its military activities in 
that area. Australia was attacked for 
what was said to be "military prepara-
tions ... [in Papua and New 
Guinea] ... for the conduct of the ag-
gressive war in Viet-Nam and for the 
direct induction of indigenous soldiers 
into that war.,,6 1 
During these 1968 proccedings the 
Representative of the Soviet Union 
spelled out succinctly what lay behind 
the Soviet offensive. In one of his most 
biting attacks to date, he said on 25 
June 1968: 62 
The infonnation before the Committee 
showed that the strategie signifieance 
of small Territories, especially islands, 
had increased, because they could be 
used for supporting far.reaching m~­
tary operations. That was particularly 
true of the island of Guam, a United 
States Colony in the Pacific Ocean, 
which had been turncd into a military 
fortress ..• [Tlhe military headquar-
ters of the region, an American Naval 
base at Apra Harbour, the Agana naval 
air station and the Anderson Air Force 
Base were on Guam. Some 38,500 
servicemen and their dependents had 
been attached to these bases in 1967. 
The Anderson Air Force Base was the 
staging point from which the B-52 
bombcrs wcre used for the aggressive 
war against the Viet-Namese people 
who wcre battling for their freedom 
and independence ••. and Guam was 
being used ••. for Polaris submarines 
which were patrolling Chinese waters. 
This should have made it crystal clear, 
even to those who would not see it 
before, that the Soviets' true purpose is 
the conversion of the U.No's efforts 
toward self-determination into one of 
its principal cold war weapons. To 
deprive the United States of the stra-
tegic island bases from which its power 
can be effectively projected in aid of a 
small nation under Communist pressure 
or attack would be a major cold war 
victory indeed. 
At the time of this writing no results 
of the Committee's studies on military 
activities in the dependent territories 
have been announced. It seems likely, 
however, that it will once again con-
demn the administering powers and that 
it will once again resolve that their 
military activities in these territories 
hinder progress towards self-determina-
tion and that they should cease. It is 
only to be hoped that the former 
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colonial m~mbers of the Committee will 
come to see how their desire for the 
self-determination of all peoples is being 
capitalized upon and lIsed by the Com-
JIIunist stutcs und that they will not 
permit the Committee's reports and 
recommendations to be further utilized 
as a source of international support of 
Communist cold war objectives. Itdoes 
seem obvious, however, that the ma-
jority of the Committee has permitted 
its purpose to be converted from that of 
an international overseer of the self-
determination process into that of a 
forum for propaganda ilssaults on the 
U.S. presence in Southeast Asia and in 
the Pacific Ocean area in general. 
Whether or not the United States will, 
or should, continue to participate in the 
Committee's work in the face of such 
unreasoning assaults is a matter which 
will have to be given careful considera-
tion before the 1969 sessions begin. 
Conclusion. There is no question but 
that the yearning of the world's peoples 
for control over their own political 
destinies is a fact of 20th century life 
which must be intelligently dealt with 
by the present administering powers, 
the dependent peoples themselvcs, and 
the international community as a whole. 
There also seems to be little doubt that 
the activities by the United Nations, to 
date, both in the Trusteeship Council 
and in the Special Committee of Twen-
ty-four, have given considerable momen-
tum to the self-determination process. 
The independence of Nauru and the 
U.S. announcement of a planned 1972 
plebiscite in the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands63 are only the most 
recent evidence of the effect of inter-
national pressure through these U.N. 
organs. What seems to be lacking in the 
process, however, at least as viewed by a 
majority of the members of the United 
Nations, is the realization that the con-
tinued insistence on "complete inde-
pendence" as the only acceptable goal 
of the self-determination process can, 
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and undoubtedly will, lead to the same 
type of fragmented, nonviable, political 
picture in the Pacific as that which 
created world tensions in the 19th and 
first half of the 20th century. Certainly 
the anticolonialists are right when they 
describe the struggle for colonial em-
pires as a source of world conflict which 
can lead to war, -and if this type of 
conflict is to be avoided in the future, it 
seems essential that conditions should 
not be re-created which could lead to 
this same type of instability and strug-
gle. 
This is not to say that the peoples of 
any particular Pacific Island territory 
should not be enabled to opt for com-
plete freedom, unassociated with any 
stronger power, if it is their desire to do 
so. It is to say that these people should 
not be pushed into such an option if it 
is really not in their best interests. 
The smallness, the isolation, and the 
lack of adequate economic resources to 
make them self supporting, clearly dic-
tate for almost all of these areas some 
sort of association-at least economic 
and defensive-with a stronger power 
which can provide continuing assistance 
to them. As political opinion in these 
areas matures, it should become obvious 
to the people that such an association, 
rather than complete freedom, will be 
most conducive to their long-term inter-
ests. It is therefore considered that given 
the time and the opportunity to develop 
their political maturity, self-determina-
tion in these small island territories will 
follow the lead of the Cook Islanders--a 
free association with the administering 
power which leaves the population in 
complete control over its internal 
processes but which continues the 
responsibility of the administering 
power over external affairs. 
There is a very distinct danger exist-
ing, however, in the failure of the former 
colonial members of the United Nations, 
and more specifically those on the Com-
mittee of Twenty-four, to discern the real 
interests of the peoples of the Pacific 
Island dependencies. These nations have 
been led to commit their voice and their 
vote to the Soviet cold war cause, a cause 
which, although using self-determination 
as a banner, perverts that banner into a· 
weapon through which it can attack the 
very nations that gave self-determination 
its start. 
A crucial diplomatic problem for the 
United States today, and indeed for the 
people of the Pacific Island depen-
dencies themselves, is to prevent this 
type of Communist distortion to so 
hasten the self-determination process in 
the Pacific so as to resull in long-term, 
serious disadvantage to the local peoples 
by the re-creation of conditions which 
will make them ripe for a new scramble 
for hegemony. 
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